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A LEGAL ADVISOR’S RESPONSIBILITY TO 
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: 
WHEN IS LEGAL ADVICE A WAR CRIME? 
Ellia Ciammaichella* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Practically every attorney in every state of the United States of 
America takes an oath to uphold the United States and state 
Constitutions.  Upon taking the oath, most United States lawyers become 
an officer of the court (“judicial officer”).  Judicial officers are held to a 
higher standard of integrity and candor by their state’s professional 
responsibility rules.  As such, although an attorney is an advocate for his 
client, in some situations an attorney must set aside his role as advocate 
and assert his role as judicial officer to maintain the integrity of the 
judicial system and uphold the United States and state Constitutions. 
The constant tension between an attorney’s role as judicial officer 
and advocate occurs because giving advice about the law is an attorney’s 
main purpose, but often that advice may further criminal conduct.  
However, as Professor Newman eloquently stated, “Neither the status of 
‘lawyer’ nor the obligation to provide access to the law should exempt 
lawyers from the criminal liabilities which face everyone else.”1  
While Professor Newman was specifically referring to a lawyer’s 
responsibility in the domestic sphere, this is equally applicable to a legal 
advisor’s responsibility to the international community.  Concededly, an 
attorney does not take an oath to uphold international law.  However, 
because a lawyer should not be exempt from the law, each and every 
lawyer, like everyone else, should be legally responsible to the 
international community.  
This Article argues that there are some limited situations where a 
lawyer, specifically a government legal advisor, has certain basic legal 
responsibilities to the international community that trump his 
responsibility to his government.  As the Nuremberg trials emphasized, 
no government official is immune from an international crime simply 
because he is acting within his official capacity.  Rather, the official is 
                                                 
*  J.D., with honors, The George Washington University Law School, 2005; B.S., 
University of California at Berkeley, 2001.  Law Clerk for the Honorable Alex R. Munson. 
This Article was written in conjunction with Professor Carnahan’s Law of War class at The 
George Washington University Law School. 
1 Joel S. Newman, Legal Advice Toward Illegal Ends, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 287, 288 (1994). 
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individually responsible for his actions because the State cannot act 
without people to act on its behalf, and only a person acting on behalf of 
the State may commit war crimes.2  
Furthermore, while a legal advisor is not truly considered a 
policymaker, this, by itself, does not dissociate the legal advisor from the 
policy.  Accordingly, when a legal advisor is so entangled in the policy 
such that he breaches his responsibility to the international community, 
he must be held accountable for the criminality of that policy. 
As such, this Article will analyze the extent of responsibility that a 
government legal advisor owes to the international community.  As 
background, Part II surveys two affirmative defenses that generally arise 
when prosecuting a government official for a war crime:  official 
immunity and immunity for acting pursuant to superior orders.  Part III 
suggests that an analysis of whether a legal advisor has breached his 
international responsibility should depend on a sliding scale test that 
considers both the legal advisor’s mens rea and his or her influence over 
the illegal policy.  Part IV provides practical applications of the 
suggested analysis by evaluating four scenarios where a legal advisor is 
internationally responsible for playing a significant role in an 
international crime.  
II.  AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY AND IMMUNITY  
FOR ACTING PURSUANT TO SUPERIOR ORDERS 
There are two main issues that, like in prosecuting any other 
government official, are relevant to prosecuting a legal advisor as a war 
criminal:  (1) immunity for acts committed as a high government official; 
and (2) immunity for acts made pursuant to superior orders.  
A legal advisor may not claim immunity for international crimes 
simply because he is acting in his official capacity.3  This follows from 
                                                 
2 United States v. von Leeb (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1948), reprinted in 11 TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW 
NO. 10, at 462, 508 (1950) [hereinafter High Command Case].  “The state being but an 
inanimate corporate entity or concept, it cannot as such make plans, determine policies, 
exercise judgment, experience fear, or be restrained or deterred from action except through 
its animate agents and representatives.”  Id. 
3 The International Law Commission (“ILC”) succinctly summarized this in Nuremberg 
Principle III: “The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under 
international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve 
him from responsibility under international law.”  Principles of International Law Recognized 
in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal: Report of the 
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 12, at 11, U.N. 
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two underlying tenets.  First, international law is superior to domestic 
law, and second, deterrence is greatest where individual responsibility is 
placed on the authors of criminal policies.  Although the superiority of 
international law may simply support State liability, “[i]t would be an 
utter disregard of reality and but legal shadow-boxing to say that only 
the state, the inanimate entity, can have guilt, and that no guilt can be 
attributed to its animate agents who devise and execute its policies.”4  
Rather, because the State cannot act on its own and must necessarily act 
through the will of its agents, the only way to deter a State’s criminal 
action is by making its agents, including legal advisors, criminally 
responsible for their personal acts.5  
The principle of international law, which under certain 
circumstances, protects the representatives of a state, 
cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as 
criminal by international law. The authors of these acts 
cannot shelter themselves behind their official position 
in order to be freed from punishment in appropriate 
proceedings.6  
Thus, while a legal advisor’s official capacity shields him from most 
liability, the legal advisor is directly responsible for his actions that are 
criminal under international law.7  In addition, the mere fact that an 
                                                                                                             
Doc.A/1316 (1950), reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 364, 375, U.N. 
Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1957/Add [hereinafter Nürnberg Principles] (emphasis omitted); see J. 
Spiropoulos, Formulation of Nürnberg Principles, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/22 (1950), reprinted in 
[1950] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 181, 192, UN. Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1957/Add.1; see also Draft 
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind: Report of the International Law 
Commission to the General Assembly, 51 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 14, art. 7, U.N. Doc. 
A/51/10, Corr.1, Corr.2 (1996), reprinted in [1996] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 15, pt. 2, 31 U.N. 
Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1, Corr.1 [hereinafter Draft Code of P&SM] (“The official 
position of an individual who commits a crime against the peace and security of mankind, 
even if he acted as head of State or Government, does not relieve him of criminal 
responsibility or mitigate punishment.”). 
4 High Command Case, supra note 2, at 508. 
5 Id. (“The state being but an inanimate corporate entity or concept, it cannot as such 
make plans, determine policies, exercise judgment, experience fear, or be restrained or 
deterred from action except through its animate agents and representatives.”); United 
States v. Göring (Int’l Mil. Trib. 1946), in 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 223 (1947), available at http://www.mazal.org/ 
Default.htm [hereinafter MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS] (“Crimes against international law are 
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”). 
6 MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 223. 
7 Sir Arthur Watts gives a concise explanation of a Head of State’s general protections, 
privileges, and immunities.  Sir Arthur Watts, Heads of States, Heads of Governments and 
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official acts in some other capacity besides a military leader does not 
immunize him from international responsibility.  For example, although 
Joachim von Ribbentrop was the Foreign Policy Adviser to Hitler,8 the 
International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) held that even assuming that 
von Ribbentrop “was personally concerned with the diplomatic rather 
than the military aspect of these actions, his diplomatic efforts were so 
closely connected with war that he could not have remained unaware of 
the aggressive nature of Hitler’s actions.”9 
Furthermore, a person acting in his official capacity as a legal advisor 
may not simply shield himself from his initiation or creation of criminal 
policy by claiming that his work product is legal advice.  For example, 
Rudolf Lehmann, Chief of the Legal Department of the Oberkommando 
der Wehrmacht (“OKW”), was sentenced to seven years imprisonment 
for his “criminal connection” to the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order, the 
Commando Order, and the Night and Fog Decree for either drafting or 
formulating the policy behind these illegal orders.10  Similarly, Joachim 
von Ribbentrop, although the Foreign Policy Adviser to Hitler, was 
convicted of war crimes for his memorandum justifying the Nazi’s 
aggressive actions on Norway, Denmark, and the Low Countries.11 
Concomitant with the principle that one may not claim immunity for 
acts within one’s official capacity is that acting pursuant to superior 
orders does not necessarily immunize a legal advisor from international 
responsibility.12  If a person cannot claim immunity for his official 
                                                                                                             
Foreign Ministers, in 247 RECUEIL DES COURS 35 (1994).  Many of these immunities can be 
extended, by analogy, to other government officials. 
8 MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 287. 
9 Id. 
10 High Command Case, supra note 2, at 690-95.  Lehmann drafted the Barbarossa 
Jurisdiction Order, which stripped the jurisdiction from the courts and allowed troops 
complete discretion to dispose of cases.  See infra notes 62, 67 and accompanying text.  
Lehman was involved in the formulation of the Commando Order, which directed certain 
units that were alleged to have engaged in illegal terrorist activity to be summarily 
executed.  He also drafted the Night and Fog Decree, which ordered the deportation of 
civilians suspected of resistance activities so that they may be tried by special courts within 
the Reich. 
11 MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 286 (“Von Ribbentrop was advised in advance 
of the attack on Norway and Denmark and of the attack on the Low Countries, and 
prepared the official Foreign Office memoranda attempting to justify these aggressive 
actions.”); see Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and 
Torture, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 689, 694 (2004) (“It is worth recalling that Ribbentrop was 
convicted at Nuremberg for having issued memoranda justifying the Nazi preemptive 
strikes against Norway, Denmark, and the Low Countries in 1940.”). 
12 Nürnberg Principles, supra note 3, at 375.  This is ILC Principle IV: “The fact that a 
person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not free him from 
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actions, then a junior person acting pursuant to superior orders may not 
claim immunity for obeying or for being influenced by those superior 
orders.13  
III.  COMPLICITY AND MORAL CHOICE 
Because a legal advisor is not exempt from international law, to the 
extent that a legal advisor is “[c]omplicit[ ] in the commission of . . . a 
war crime,” he is acting criminally under international law.14  For 
example, under the policymaker rule, a policymaker who creates or 
implements a policy, order, legislation, or decree which authorizes or 
directs the commission of a crime is a war criminal if the crime was 
actually committed in the prosecution of war.15  Generally, a legal 
advisor does not fall under the policymaker rule.  However, if a war 
crime actually occurred, a legal advisor may be criminally responsible 
for policy that directed or implemented the war crime if he understands 
the consequences of the policy and has enough influence to shape the 
policy.  In other words, a legal advisor has not committed a war crime 
unless he has what the IMT called a “moral choice.”  
A. The Theory of Complicity Requires that a War Crime Actually Occur 
Because a legal advisor’s international responsibility is based on 
complicity, and not conspiracy, the threshold inquiry is whether a war 
                                                                                                             
responsibility under international law.” Id.  (emphasis omitted); see Spiropoulos, supra note 
3, at 192; see also Draft Code of P&SM, supra note 3, at art. 5 (“The fact that an individual 
charged with a crime against the peace and security of mankind acted pursuant to an order 
of a Government or a superior does not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be 
considered in mitigation of punishment if justice so requires.”). 
13 A legal advisor acting pursuant to superior orders, however, may not have the 
requisite culpability.  As mere association to criminal conduct is not sufficient, acting 
pursuant to superior orders may effectively negate an essential part of the balancing test 
prescribed infra.  High Command Case, supra note 2, at 484.  Because “criminal 
responsibility is an individual matter; . . . criminal guilt must be personal.”  Id. 
14 Nürnberg Principles, supra note 3, at 377 (emphasis omitted). 
15 Draft Code of P&SM, supra note 3, at art. 5; see Agreement by the Government of the 
United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment 
of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis app., art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 15477, 
82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Charter of the International Military Tribunal] (“Leaders, 
organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a 
common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all 
acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.”); WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY 
ON TRIAL: THE EVIDENCE AT NUREMBERG 503 (rev. ed. 1999) (“War crimes must be 
committed in the course of war, and must be related to war prosecution.”). 
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crime actually occurred.16  Thus, an official is not individually 
responsible if an international standard was not breached17 or if the 
breach did not amount to a “grave harm to the international 
community.”18 
While some international scholars have interpreted the Geneva 
Conventions to delineate war crime standards based on whether the 
armed conflict was international or non-international in character, the 
current customary international law makes no such distinction.  During 
international armed conflict—that is, armed conflict between two or 
more States19—war crimes are acts that constitute a grave breach of the 
Geneva Conventions.20  Grave breaches include willful killing, torture or 
                                                 
16 Draft Code of P&SM, supra note 3, at art. 2; see, e.g., High Command Case, supra note 2, 
at 565 (acquitting Hugo Sperrle because although he may have ordered subordinate units 
to force Russian prisoners of war to work in construction units, there was no evidence in 
the record that a crime was actually committed). 
17 Conspiracy to commit a war crime has not yet risen to the level of international 
responsibility.  However, because a conspiracy to commit an act of aggression is the 
essence of a crime against peace, conspiracy is an international crime in that context.  
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 223.  Some commentators suggest that conspiracy, 
as a war crime, has gained status in the international community.  See Howard S. Levie, The 
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Comparison with the Past and a 
Look at the Future, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 1, 11 n.60 (1995).  However, conspiracy 
has not risen to the level of customary international law.  Richard Barrett and Professor 
Laura Little succinctly explained the difference between complicity and conspiracy in 
Lessons of Yugoslav Rape Trials: A Role for Conspiracy Law in International Tribunals, 88 MINN. 
L. REV. 30, 37 (2003). 
18 ROBERT K. WOETZEL, NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 110 (2d ed. 1962); see 
United States v. List (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1948), reprinted in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1241 (1950) 
[hereinafter Hostage Case] (“An international crime is such an act universally recognized 
as criminal, which is considered a grave matter of international concern and for some valid 
reason cannot be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state that would have control 
over it under ordinary circumstances.”). 
19 The definition of international armed conflict is based on Common Article 2. Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 
75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] [collectively Common Article 2]. 
20 Oren Gross, The Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 
16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 783, 800 n.58 (1995); see Geneva Convention I, supra note 19, at art. 49; 
Geneva Convention II, supra note 19, at art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 19, at art. 
129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 19, at art. 146; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
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inhuman treatment, and willfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury to body or health.21 
Concededly, when the conflict is not of an international character, 
the Geneva Conventions do not explicitly mandate individual 
responsibility.  Common Article 3, however, creates limited protection to 
persons participating in a non-international armed conflict.22  
“Guerrillas, therefore, even if unprivileged combatants and not entitled 
on capture to the status of prisoners of war, would appear now always to 
be entitled to humane treatment and trial by a regular court.”23  
Moreover, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) stated that Common 
Article 3 is the “minimum yardstick” for any type of armed conflict and 
constitutes customary international law.24  Like grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions, 
violence to life and person, in particular murder of all 
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture[,] . . . taking of hostages[,] . . . outrages upon 
personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and 
degrading treatment[,] . . . the passing of sentences and 
the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples25 
are all concerns that the international community does not take lightly.  
Accordingly, if the IMT’s analysis is similarly applicable to non-
international armed conflict, government officials are internationally 
responsible for violating Common Article 3 or, in the alternative, 
responsible for violating customary international law as expressed in 
Common Article 3.26 
                                                                                                             
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 85.1, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I]. 
21 Geneva Convention I, supra note 19, at art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 19, at 
art. 51; Geneva Convention III, supra note 19, at  art. 130; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 
19, at art. 147. 
22 Geneva Conventions I-IV, supra note 19, at art. 3 [collectively Common Article 3]. 
23 JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 567 (2d ed. 1959). 
24 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 114 ¶ 218 (June 27). 
25 Common Article 3, supra note 22. 
26 Id.  Geneva Protocol II also deals with the rules of non-international armed conflict.  
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
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B. Sufficient Culpability or “Moral Choice” Is a Requisite for International 
Criminality 
Even if a war crime actually occurred, a legal advisor will not be 
internationally responsible for illegal acts unless he has sufficient 
culpability.27  The Nuremberg Military Tribunal (“NMT”) in the High 
Command Case explained that the culpability requirement was extracted 
from “fundamental principles of criminal law as generally accepted by 
the civilized nations of the world.”28  Similarly, the IMT defined 
culpability by asking whether the actor had a “moral choice.”29  Whether 
the actor had a “moral choice” was determined by analyzing the actor’s 
mens rea and his actual ability to influence policy.30  
Accordingly, when a legal advisor has a high mens rea and a weak 
ability to influence or ignore criminal policy, he is sufficiently culpable.  
For example, this occurs when a legal advisor has actual knowledge of 
the criminality of the policy.31  Actual knowledge32 satisfies the “moral 
choice” standard because the legal advisor knows that one choice is 
                                                                                                             
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 
[hereinafter Geneva Protocol II]. 
27 High Command Case, supra note 2, at 484.  The Nuremberg Military Tribunal 
(“NMT”) in the High Command Case noted that the culpability requirement was extracted 
from “fundamental principles of criminal law as generally accepted by the civilized nations 
of the world.”  Id. at 510.  Thus, since mere association is not sufficient to support criminal 
responsibility, strict liability does not satisfy the culpability standard.  Id. at 511.  A person 
“cannot be held criminally responsible for a mere error in judgment as to disputable legal 
questions.”  Id. 
28 Id. at 510. 
29 The International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) acknowledged that the requisite 
individual culpability is satisfied when a “moral choice was in fact possible.”  MAJOR WAR 
CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 224.  The NMT described the requisite culpability as “a personal 
act voluntarily done with knowledge of its inherent criminality under international law.”  
High Command Case, supra note 2, at 510. 
30 In essence, the mens rea analysis tests whether the actor understood that he had a 
decision to make and the ability to influence policy tests whether the actor had the ability 
to choose between right and wrong. 
31 High Command Case, supra note 2, at 693.  For example, in holding Lehmann 
responsible for the criminality of the Commando Order, the NMT emphasized that 
“[Lehmann] was well aware of the criminal nature of this order.”  Id. 
32 The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) defines knowledge in two ways: 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant 
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that 
such circumstances exist; and 
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is 
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (1962).  “When knowledge of the existence of a particular 
fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high 
probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.”  Id. § 2.02(7). 
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permissible and the other choice is illegal.  Thus, the legal advisor has 
the chance to choose the permissible action. 
On the other end of the spectrum, if a legal advisor has a low mens 
rea but a strong ability to influence criminal policy, he is also criminally 
culpable.  The axiom that ignorance of the law is no excuse speaks well 
for this type of situation.33  At this level of mens rea, criminal 
responsibility would apply “if [a legal advisor] can reasonably be 
expected to know that the act is a crime.”34  Thus, the standard is 
whether a reasonable legal advisor should have known that the policy 
was criminal.35 
In this respect, this Article contends that the reasonable legal advisor 
standard is the general practice of legal advisors as recognized by 
civilized nations.36  One can appreciate this by analyzing the High 
Command Case and comparing the reasonable legal advisor with the 
field commander of normal intelligence (“reasonable field commander”), 
and the differing roles that they play in war.  In the High Command 
Case, the NMT reasoned that because the field commander performs in 
active combat and does not have the full resources that are available to 
legal advisors, a reasonable field commander “has the right to presume, 
in the absence of specific knowledge to the contrary, that the legality of 
                                                 
33 WOETZEL, supra note 18, at 119.  “It is clear that ignorance of the criminal nature of the 
act is no excuse . . . .”  Id. 
34 Id.  This sounds very similar to the MPC definition of negligence.  See MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.02(2)(d). 
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an 
offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.  The 
risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to 
perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the 
circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s 
situation. 
Id. 
35 High Command Case, supra note 2, at 512 (standard of “normal intelligence”).  While 
the NMT is referring to the standard applicable to a commanding officer, the main tenets of 
the NMT’s analysis are equally applicable to a legal advisor.  Especially important to note 
is that the NMT specifically distinguishes the limited legal capacities of field commanders 
in active combat from those of legal advisors.  Id. at 511.  Thus, this suggests that the 
standard as to whether an order is “criminal upon its face” depends on the ordinary legal 
facilities associated with a person acting within a specific duty.  In the case of a legal 
advisor, the ordinary legal facilities are greater than a field commander. 
36 This Article adapts Article 38 of the ICJ statute to a legal advisor’s work product 
standard.  See U.N. CHARTER annex art. 38 [hereinafter Statute of the ICJ]. 
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such orders has been properly determined before their issuance.”37  
Thus, the NMT found it was excusable for a field commander to transmit 
criminal orders during active combat when he passed the order down 
the chain of command, unless the order was “criminal upon its face” or if 
he actually knew the order was criminal.38  The NMT explained that an 
order was “criminal upon its face” if a legal opinion was not necessary to 
understand the illegality of the order.39  
In contrast, a legal advisor is in a better position to influence policy:  
a reasonable legal advisor is not generally in active combat and has the 
faculties to better understand the legality of the policy.  Thus, the legal 
advisor may be culpable even when he does not actually know that the 
policy is “criminal upon its face.”  On the other hand, if, after diligent 
research, a reasonable legal advisor may not be able to determine 
whether an act is criminal, then he would be in a situation similar to that 
of a reasonable field commander:  he would not have the ability to 
choose between right and wrong. 
Finally, if the legal advisor has absolutely no ability to influence 
criminal policy, then, no matter what his mens rea is, under the 
policymaker rule he has no “moral choice” and would not be 
internationally responsible for the war crimes that occur due to the 
criminal policy.40  Such lack of “moral choice” occurs:  (1) when the actor 
has no ability to influence the policy;41 or (2) when a reasonable person 
could not have acted any other way.42 
The first circumstance occurs only if an actor does all that he could 
but fails to resist the illegal policy.  While Professor Woetzel suggests 
that a tribunal may consider the “extent an individual could resist an 
illegal order,”43 implying that something short of doing everything to 
                                                 
37 High Command Case, supra note 2, at 511. 
38 Id. at 509; cf. Hostage Case, supra note 18, at 1236 (“[I]f the illegality of the order was 
not known to the inferior, and he could not reasonably have been expected to know of its 
illegality, no wrongful intent necessary to the commission of a crime exists and the inferior 
will be protected.”).  This “clearly criminal” or criminality “on its face” standard suggests a 
recklessness standard. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c). 
39 High Command Case, supra note 2, at 512. 
40 Some tribunals seem to refer to this as an affirmative defense. 
41 In the circumstance where the actor has no ability to influence the policy, it is unclear 
whether the burden of proof is on the prosecution or the defense. 
42 This is a claim of duress. According to the final judgment in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, 
“duress does not afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime against 
humanity and/or a war crime involving the killing of innocent human beings . . . .”  No. IT-
96-22, Appeals Chamber Judgment 4 (Mar. 5, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty. 
43 See WOETZEL, supra note 18, at 118-19. 
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resist the illegal policy would suffice, the Justice Case indicates 
otherwise.  Most telling is that in the Justice Case, Curt Rothenberger, the 
State Secretary of the Reich Ministry of Justice, was convicted of 
“aid[ing] and abett[ing] in the program of racial persecution, and 
notwithstanding his many protestations to the contrary [the NMT held 
that] he materially contributed toward the prostitution of the Ministry of 
Justice.”44  
However, where an actor “protests” against the application of the 
policy, “oppose[s] it in every way short of open and defiant refusal to 
obey it” but the policy is still applied, the actor is not criminally 
responsible for the resulting illegal actions connected to the policy.45  A 
good example of an actor in this situation is von Leeb and his connection 
to the Commissar Order.46  The Commissar Order resulted in the murder 
of many commissars who opposed Hitler’s troops.  The NMT held that 
by expressing his opposition to the Commissar Order and by attempting 
to thwart the enforcement of the Commissar Order by drawing attention 
to the Maintenance of Discipline Order, von Leeb did all that he could 
do, and therefore was not responsible for the resulting catastrophe of the 
Commissar Order.47 
The second circumstance where a lack of moral choice exists occurs 
if a “reasonable man would apprehend that he was in such imminent 
physical peril as to deprive him of freedom to choose the right and 
refrain from the wrong.”48  In such a circumstance, the actor is not 
personally responsible for the crime committed.  According to the NMT 
in the Einstazgruppen Case, the reasonable man would weigh the harm 
                                                 
44 United States v. Altstötter, (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1948), reprinted in 3 TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW 
NO. 10, at 1118 (1951) [hereinafter Justice Case].  Rothenberger was found “guilty of taking 
a minor but consenting part in the Night and Fog [Decree],” which ordered the deportation 
of civilians suspected of resistance activities so that they may be tried by special courts.  Id.  
The NMT found that despite being a public advocate of an independent judiciary and 
publicly protesting against the Party and Gestapo officers from interfering with the judges 
in pending cases, “he materially contributed toward the prostitution of the Ministry of 
Justice and the courts and their subordination to the arbitrary will of Hitler, the Party 
minions, and the police.”  Id. 
45 High Command Case, supra note 2, at 557. 
46 Id. at 555-58. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 509. 
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caused by obeying the illegal policy against the harm caused by 
disobeying the illegal policy.49  
Arguably, as Judge Cassese stated in his separate and dissenting 
opinion in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, this balance sounds like one simply 
must take the “lesser of two evils”;50 however, tribunal decisions have 
required the illegal policy to be more than the lesser of two evils.  For 
example, in the Justice Case, even though “[t]he evidence conclusively 
show[ed] that in order to maintain the Ministry of Justice in the good 
graces of Hitler and to prevent its utter defeat by Himmler’s police,” 
Franz Schlegelberger, Acting Reich Minister of Justice, was convicted 
under counts two and three of the indictment.51  While it may have been 
true that a worse man may have taken Schlegelberger’s place and that 
Schlegelberger was the lesser of two evils, that was not a sufficient 
justification to continue the illegal work demanded of him. 
For several reasons, this is an onerous standard to meet.  First, past 
cases suggest that the tribunals will assume that a person has some type 
of influence, in effect shifting the burden of proof onto the accused.52  
Second, because the standard does not consider the actor’s subjective 
view, the tribunal may disregard the irrationality that the actor may face 
when attempting to reason whether the physical peril was imminent.53  
Third, the reasoning that an actor must undergo before he is considered 
to be deprived of the freedom to choose right from wrong is hardly 
practical.  First, the legal advisor must assess the imminence of the 
physical peril and also evaluate the extent of damage the illegal order 
would cause.54  Then, the legal advisor must compare the competing 
                                                 
49 United States v. Ohlendorf (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1949), reprinted in 4 TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW 
NO. 10, at 471 (1950) [hereinafter Einsatzgruppen Case]. 
If the nature of the ordered act is manifestly beyond the scope of the 
superior’s authority, the subordinate may not plead ignorance of the 
criminality of the order. If one claims duress in the execution of an 
illegal order it must be shown that the harm caused by obeying the 
illegal order is not disproportionally greater than the harm which 
would result from not obeying the illegal order. 
Id. 
50 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, No. IT-96-22, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Cassese, ¶ 16 (Oct. 7, 1996), available at http://www.un.org/icty. 
51 Justice Case, supra note 44, at 1086. 
52 High Command Case, supra note 2, at 509 (emphasizing that this is a defense of 
coercion or necessity).  Thus, this Article considers this an affirmative defense. 
53 Id. 
54 Id.  “The defendants in this case who received obviously criminal orders were placed 
in a difficult position, but servile compliance with orders clearly criminal for fear of some 
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factors and make a decision.  This entire analysis must be based on 
foresight, rather than a tribunal’s hindsight analysis.  Such a task would 
put anyone in a difficult position, but the NMT has said that being in a 
“difficult position” is not enough.55  
Finally, even if an actor in the second circumstance understood the 
extent of harm, this balance must greatly favor obeying the illegal policy.  
The NMT stated that “the harm caused by obeying the illegal [policy] is 
not disproportionally greater than the harm which would result from not 
obeying the illegal [policy].”56  Thus, unless the choice is to kill or be 
killed, the balance does not seem to greatly favor obeying the illegal 
policy.57  As a result, while an affirmative defense exists on paper, it 
rarely meets reality.58 
IV.  HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS 
Concededly, there are many circumstances where legal advice is too 
tangential to the creation or the implementation of the criminal policy for 
the legal advisor to meet the requisite culpability for international 
criminal responsibility.  However, there are several situations where the 
legal advisor acts under the guise of counsel but actually enters the 
realm of establishing or implementing policy. 
In this respect, this Article proposes that a high-ranking legal advisor 
may be internationally responsible for his “advice” under two alternative 
theories.  The first theory, addressed in Scenarios One through Three, is 
direct responsibility based on the legal advisor’s furtherance of a 
criminal endeavor.  This theory applies when a legal advisor gives 
advice knowing that it will be used for an international criminal purpose 
or to formulate an illegal policy.  This is similar to standards established 
in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as set out by the American Bar 
Association and is based on customary international law that finds 
planning, instigating, ordering, committing, aiding, abetting, or pursuing 
                                                                                                             
disadvantage or punishment not immediately threatened cannot be recognized as a 
defense.”  Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Einsatzgruppen Case, supra note 49, at 471. 
57 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, No. IT-96-22-Tbis, Trial Chamber II Judgment, ¶ 17 (Mar. 5, 
1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty. 
58 While it may seem difficult to fathom a legal advisor finding himself in “imminent 
physical peril,” judges and prosecutors may find themselves in this situation.  See, e.g., id. at 
954. 
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a common international criminal purpose to be a war crime.59  The 
second theory, addressed in Scenario Four, is command responsibility.  
Unlike the first theory, this theory does not require that the advice be 
criminal.  Instead, it is based on the idea that the legal advice created a 
“permissive climate” for illegal conduct.60 
A. Scenario One:  A Legal Advisor Incorporates His Own Criminal Idea into 
the Final Version of the Policy 
The simplest scenario is when a legal advisor incorporates his 
criminal idea into the final version of the policy.61  In this situation, the 
legal advisor is not even acting as a counselor.  To the extent that the 
legal advisor claims that he is simply giving legal advice, the “legal 
advice” is merely a façade to hide his attempt to make criminal policy. 
For example, the NMT found that Rudolf Lehmann’s criminal idea to 
punish individuals that would have been acquitted by the judicial 
process was integrated into the final version of the Barbarossa 
Jurisdiction Order.62  Finding that Lehmann was the originator of the 
idea, the NMT held “[Lehmann] responsible for [his] criminal connection 
with, participation in, and formulation of [the Barbarossa Jurisdiction 
Order].”63  The NMT also held Lehmann criminally liable for his 
                                                 
59 Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber II Opinion and Judgment 249, ¶ 674 
(May 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty. 
60 Bilder & Vagts, supra note 11, at 691. 
61 Several legal advisors at the annual Legal Advisers’ Meeting “stressed that the Legal 
Adviser’s function was also part of the policy formulation process.”  Hans Corell, Third 
Legal Advisers’ Meeting at UN Headquarters in New York, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 323, 325 (1993).  
Thus, the author suspects that legal advisors may, more often than not, encounter Scenario 
One.  The informal meeting, organized by the “Legal Advisers of the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs of Canada, India, Mexico, Poland and Sweden, and with the assistance of the Legal 
Counsel of the United Nations,” is meant to create an atmosphere where legal advisors can 
spontaneously debate over the developing issues in international law.  Hans Corell, Legal 
Advisers Meet at UN Headquarters in New York, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 371, 371-73 (1991). 
62 See High Command Case, supra note 2, at 691-93.  The Tribunal found that it was 
Lehmann’s idea to completely deny jurisdiction to the courts, in effect giving the troops 
complete discretion to dispose cases.  Id. at 692-93.  This “left the door wide open to the 
decision of an officer of at least the rank of a battalion commander to impose such 
collective punishments as he saw fit.”  Id. at 692.  Lehmann’s idea was particularly 
important because, in his own words, “troops will get rid of just those cases which they 
consider awkward, namely, the doubtful cases by handing them over to the courts.”  Id. at 
692-93.  Thus, Lehmann intended to permit the punishment of individuals that would have 
been acquitted for lack of evidence.  Id. at 693.  This, the IMT held, was criminal: “This 
provision in the order . . . is one of the most vicious parts of the orders.”  Id. 
63 Id.  “This provision in the order . . . obviously was not derived from Hitler, or Keitel, 
or Jodi . . . .”  Id. 
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contribution in enlarging the scope of the original Terror and Sabotage 
Decrees.64   
Thus, where the legal advisor is the originator of the criminal idea 
and that criminal idea becomes part of the final policy, the legal advisor 
is then responsible for the resulting criminal policy. 
B. Scenario Two:  A Legal Advisor Compiles Other People’s Criminal Ideas 
and Is the Main Factor in Determining the Final Version of the Policy 
A legal advisor in Scenario Two compiles other people’s criminal 
ideas into one concise criminal policy. 65   
If the basic idea is criminal under international law, the 
staff officer who puts that idea into the form of a 
military order, either himself or through subordinates 
under him, or takes personal action to see that it is 
properly distributed to those units where it becomes 
effective, commits a criminal act under international 
law.66   
A good example of a legal advisor in Scenario Two is Lehmann and 
his connection to the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order, the Commando 
Order, the Night and Fog Decree, and the Terror and Sabotage Decrees.67  
A legal advisor’s responsibility in Scenario Two is supported by both 
a deterrence and culpability rationale.  The deterrence theory is based on 
the fact that no matter how much authority one person has, he cannot 
implement that policy by himself.68  Those who draft policy are 
                                                 
64 Id. at 695. 
65 The NMT described it this way: “The basic criminal offense is in the essential part a 
staff officer [or legal advisor] performs in making effective the criminal whole.”  Id. at 693. 
66 Id. at 513. 
67 Id. at 691-95; see supra note 10 and accompanying text.  Although Lehmann’s ideas 
were incorporated into the Barbarossa Jurisdiction order, the NMT emphasized that 
Lehmann was also responsible for his contribution to the final form of that order.  High 
Command Case, supra note 2, at 693.  The Terror and Sabotage Decree was signed by 
Lehmann and provided that all acts of violence by non-German civilians in occupied 
territories are deemed to be acts of terrorism and sabotage and that all terrorists and 
saboteurs should be shot down on the spot, all terrorists and saboteurs who are 
apprehended must be handed over to the Security Police, and all women terrorists and 
saboteurs who take no active part in the fighting must be employed as laborers. 
68 The NMT recognized this in its analysis of crimes against peace.  High Command 
Case, supra note 2, at 486.  “No matter how absolute his authority, Hitler alone could not 
formulate a policy of aggressive war and alone implement that policy by preparing, 
planning, and waging such a war.”  Id. 
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“indispensable” and an “essential contribution to the final execution” of 
criminal policy.69  A person with a criminal idea necessarily needs other 
people to help implement it by consolidating it into a coherent policy.  
Thus, by deterring those key players, the originator of the criminal idea 
will be greatly impeded from implementing the criminal idea. 
In addition, a legal advisor in Scenario Two meets the requisite 
culpability because there are two important features underlying Scenario 
Two:  (1) a legal advisor acting in this capacity has the obligation and 
resources to detect the criminality of the ideas; and (2) a legal advisor 
acting in this capacity has substantial influence over the final structure of 
the criminal policy.  First, unlike the intermediate administrative officer 
who routinely transmits orders and has no time to screen the orders he 
transmits, a reasonable legal advisor has time to deliberate over the 
policies.70  Similarly, unlike field commanders, a reasonable legal advisor 
has the time and resources to detect the illegality.71  In fact, a legal 
advisor’s specialty is to determine the legality of a proposed conduct.  As 
such, if a reasonable legal advisor would understand that the policy is 
criminal, he would have the requisite mens rea. 
Second, unlike both the intermediate administrative officer and the 
field commander, a legal advisor in Scenario Two has substantial 
influence over the final structure of the criminal policy.  Because the 
legal advisor performs “fundamental and essential functions . . . in 
producing a military order [and policy] from an original idea[,]”72 a legal 
advisor is the “main factor in [implementing] the final form” of the 
policy.73  A legal advisor acting in this capacity “modifie[s] those ideas 
within his own sphere up to a certain point and place[s] the whole into 
an effective military order which [is] transmitted to the troops and 
                                                 
69 Id. at 515. 
70 See id. at 510 (explaining that the intermediate administrative function of transmitting 
an order does not amount to the requisite personal guilt because “transmittal is a routine 
function[,] . . . in many instances [it] would be handled . . . without being called to his 
attention[,]” and the person transmitting “is not in a position to screen orders so 
transmitted”). 
71 See infra Part IV.D; cf. High Command Case, supra note 2, at 511 (explaining that 
because a field commander makes decisions in active combat and has limited legal 
facilities, “[a field commander] has the right to presume, in the absence of specific 
knowledge to the contrary, that the legality of such orders has been properly determined 
before their issuance”). 
72 High Command Case, supra note 2, at 691. 
73 Id. at 693.  As of 1939, customary international law made it criminal for the 
participation of military officers at the policy influencing level.  Id. at 489. 
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carried out.”74  Therefore, a legal advisor has the requisite culpability to 
be held accountable for the criminal policy.  
C. Scenario Three:  A Legal Advisor Attempts To Cover a Criminal Policy 
with the Spin of Legality 
In Scenario Three, a legal advisor is criminally implicated when he is 
aware of the criminal nature of the policy, but nevertheless, attempts to 
give it an appearance of legality.75  Scenario Three has at least two 
variants.  In the first variant, a legal advisor, knowing that the policy is 
criminal, revises the criminal policy to give it an impression of legality.76  
This is especially significant in modern international law because legal 
advice is often an attempt to cover illegal policy with legal analysis.77  
For example, Rudolf Lehmann was held criminally responsible for a part 
of the Commando Order for “ma[king] certain suggestions as to methods 
which might, by a strained construction, give some appearance of 
legality and be suitable for publication; constructions which he 
apparently did not believe himself.”78  
In the second variant, a legal advisor, knowing that the policy is 
criminal, justifies the legality of the criminal policy in hopes of 
convincing other people that the criminal policy is actually legal.79  It 
would seem that such an analysis could never amount to a war crime.  
After all, it is the client who chooses to act.  However, legal advice is 
often requested to further a criminal endeavor.80  In some situations, a 
                                                 
74 Id. at 693. 
75 Id. at 693-94. 
76 See id. 
77 Newman, supra note 1, at 287; see Stanko Nick, The Role of the Legal Adviser in Modern 
Diplomatic Services, in MODERN DIPLOMACY (Jovan Kurbalija ed., 1998), available at 
http://www.diplomacy.edu/Books/mdiplomacy_book/ (“It is significant that even 
countries and their leaders who bluntly break fundamental rules and principles of 
international law almost invariably make a considerable effort to wrap their acts in a 
legally presentable or at least justifiable form.”). 
78 High Command Case, supra note 2, at 693-94. 
79 See MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 286.  Often in a situation like this a legal 
advisor is attempting to “assist or provide a ‘road map’” which amounts to complicity in 
the criminal conduct.  Bilder & Vagts, supra note 11, at 694 (citations omitted).  Because 
legal advisors often encounter this situation, the International Law Commission has 
expressed doubt over the value of a legal advisor’s opinion as evidence of customary 
international law.  See Manley O. Hudson, Article 24 of the Statute of the International Law 
Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/16, reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 24, 30, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1957/Add.  “Reserve may be needed in assessing the value of 
[opinions of legal advisers] as evidence of customary international law, for the efforts of 
legal advisers are necessarily directed to the implementation of policy.”  Id. 
80 Newman, supra note 1, at 287. 
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reasonable legal advisor would understand that the most likely reason a 
client would request advice on the specific issue is to avoid the 
consequences of a crime already committed or a crime that may be 
committed in the future.81  For example, von Ribbentrop was held 
criminally responsible for justifying aggressive actions on Norway, 
Denmark, and the Low Countries.82  
Unlike the previous two scenarios, however, a legal advisor in 
Scenario Three may not have the requisite culpability.83  First, because 
the legal advisor is reviewing someone else’s final product, he has less 
influence over the resulting policy.  Second, the conduct of either 
revising a policy to conform to international standards or justifying the 
legality of the policy falls under genuine legal counsel.  Thus, a more 
demanding mens rea standard is required to prevent the presumption of 
criminal responsibility based on mere association to the criminal policy. 
Third, the most important reason for a higher mens rea standard in 
Scenario Three is that the conduct alone may merely be a result of 
negligence or mistake.  Before a legal advisor counsels his client on the 
legal consequences of a proposed conduct, the legal advisor must 
determine what the law is at that time and then determine whether the 
proposed conduct may violate the law.84  When the issue touches upon 
public international law, the legal advisor must not only interpret 
applicable treaties, but must also recognize “international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law, the general principles of 
law recognized by civilized nations, . . . [and] judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations . . . .”85  Thus, because the “law is not static, but by continual 
                                                 
81 Id.  “There might be legitimate reasons for such a request, but the most likely reason 
would be a desire to avoid prosecution for a committed crime.”  Id. 
82 See MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 286 (“Von Ribbentrop was advised in 
advance of the attack on Norway and Denmark and of the attack on the Low Countries, 
and prepared the official Foreign Office memoranda attempting to justify these aggressive 
actions.”); see Bilder & Vagts, supra note 11, at 694 (analogizing von Ribbentrop’s issuance 
of the memoranda justifying the attack to a legal advisor’s criminal actions). 
83 As stated in Part III, supra, culpability is a function of both the legal advisor’s actual 
ability to influence policy and the legal advisor’s mens rea. 
84 This is similar to the two-part test that Judge Anderson expressed in his concurring 
opinion in the Krupp Case. United States v. Krupp (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1949), reprinted in 9 
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL 
COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 405 (1950) [hereinafter Krupp Case] (“(a) what was the law at the 
time in question, and (b) does the evidence show prima facie that the defendants or any of 
them violated it”). 
85 Statute of the ICJ, supra note 36, at art. 38; see MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 
221. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 3 [2007], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss3/7
2007] Legal Advice as a War Crime 1161 
adaptation follows the needs of a changing world[,]”86 it is especially 
difficult for a legal advisor to determine the current understanding of 
issues not yet solidified by international consensus.  In this respect, 
knowledge that the policy is actually criminal would suffice.  In 
addition, if the policy were criminal on its face, a legal advisor would 
have sufficient culpability to be held responsible for the policy.87  
There are three practical reasons for applying criminality for 
Scenario Three.  First, a person knowledgeable in the law is the best 
person to hide the criminality of the policy, thus making the crime more 
difficult to detect.  Second, “there may be strong pressures on 
government lawyers [or legal advisors] to ‘bend’ or ignore the law in 
order to support policy decisions . . . .”88  If the legal advisor is not held 
responsible for his advice, then he will not be deterred from caving into 
these strong pressures, even when his legal insight strongly suggests that 
the policy is criminal.  Third, because “foreign policy decisions are often 
highly political, and policymakers and others who influence policy are 
often skeptical concerning the relevance of international law[,]”89 a legal 
advisor who informs the government that the proposed conduct is most 
likely illegal will have strong influence on the final policy decision.  This 
is especially so when the legal advisor is counseling a democratic, law-
abiding country.90  
D. Scenario Four:  A Legal Advisor Creates or Implements a Policy, Which 
While Not Illegal, Creates a Permissive Atmosphere for Criminal Conduct 
Unlike the previous three instances where the legal advisor is held 
responsible for his direct participation in a criminal conduct, in Scenario 
Four, the legal advisor, if at all, is held criminally accountable based on 
                                                 
86 MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 221. 
87 High Command Case, supra note 2, at 509.  The NMT also suggested that believing the 
policy to be criminal is sufficient.  Id. at 693-94.  However, if this is the case, how much faith 
must a legal advisor have in the legality of a policy before he is willing to venture into 
revising or justifying a policy?  The author suggests that the NMT merely interchanged the 
meaning of “belief” with “knowledge.”  Otherwise, this would rely too heavily on the 
reasonable legal advisor standard, which is quite malleable. 
88 Bilder & Vagts, supra note 11, at 693 (citations omitted); see C.G. WEERAMANTRY, 
UNIVERSALISING INTERNATIONAL LAW 212 (2004) (“All too often at the highest levels of 
government and foreign and military policy there is an expectation that legal opinions will 
conform to the wishes of those in authority . . . .”). 
89 Bilder & Vagts, supra note 11, at 693 (citations omitted). 
90 More and more States have a policy of abiding by international law.  WEERAMANTRY, 
supra note 88, at 211.  “Signs are discernible at the highest levels of state policy of an 
increased readiness to abide by the dictates of international law.”  Id. 
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the rubric of command responsibility.91  The best example of Scenario 
Four is Field Marshall Wilhelm von Leeb’s connection to the Barbarossa 
Jurisdiction Order in the High Command Case.92  As commander of his 
army group, he put the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order into the chain of 
command.93  The NMT concluded that even if the order was not 
criminal, it “was at best ambiguous in respect to the authority conferred 
upon a junior officer to shoot individuals who were merely suspected of 
certain acts.”94  Furthermore, the NMT found that von Leeb did not 
prevent the illegal application of the order by clarification or otherwise 
by including further instructions.95  “Having set this instrument in 
motion, he must assume a measure of responsibility for its illegal 
application[,]” and thus he was indirectly responsible for failing to place 
safeguards within the order.96 
The theory behind command responsibility is twofold. First, “[b]y 
doing nothing he cannot wash his hands of international 
responsibility.”97  A legal advisor has the ability to influence the 
application of the policy and probably understands that he has this 
capability.  Thus, when a reasonable legal advisor has reason to know 
that although the policy is legal, the policy is ambiguous, he is just as 
culpable as a person who implements the illegal policy.  Second, in 
implementing an ambiguous policy, the legal advisor has breached his 
duty.98  Because the machinery of the government not only requires the 
forging and implementation of policy but also the application of that 
policy by others, a reasonable legal advisor should know that policy is 
created so that others will follow that policy.  Thus, the person in charge 
of implementing that policy has the duty to ensure that the policy is 
sufficiently definite. 
                                                 
91 Art. 2 of the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
succinctly summarizes command responsibility.  “An individual shall be responsible for a 
[war] crime . . . if that individual . . . [f]ails to prevent or repress the commission of such a 
crime in the circumstances set out in article 6 . . . .”  Draft Code of P&SM, supra note 3, at art. 
2. 
92 High Command Case, supra note 2, at 521-25. 
93 Id. at 560. 
94 Id.  For more information about the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order, see supra note 62 
and accompanying text. 
95 High Command Case, supra note 2, at 560. 
96 Id. at 560-61. 
97 Id. at 512. 
98 See Colonel William G. Eckhardt, Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea for a Workable 
Standard, 97 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1982) (emphasizing that command responsibility does not 
attach unless the actor has breached a duty). 
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Therefore, the doctrine of command responsibility requires that a 
person, such as a legal advisor, who “knew or had reason to know, in the 
circumstances at the time, that the subordinate was committing or was 
going to commit such a crime[, must] . . . take all necessary measures 
within [his] power to prevent or repress the crime.”99  Accordingly, 
while the policy is not necessarily criminal under international law, 
where a reasonable legal advisor would understand that the policy 
creates a permissive atmosphere for criminal conduct, the legal advisor 
should be held accountable for the actions that follow from that policy. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
A person who leads others to commit a crime and the person who 
actually commits the crime share equal culpability in the commission of 
the crime.100  The NMT in the High Command Case succinctly described 
it this way:  “It is self-evident that national policies are made by man.  
When men make a policy that is criminal under international law, they 
are criminally responsible for so doing. This is the logical and 
inescapable conclusion.”101  Furthermore, “[i]f the policy under which it 
is initiated is criminal in its intent and purpose it is so because the 
individuals at the policy-making level had a criminal intent and purpose 
in determining the policy.”102  In addition, because the masterminds of 
the criminal violations are not involved with the physical action of 
committing the crime, failure to hold these individuals accountable for 
their complicity would undermine the principle of deterrence.  As “[t]he 
acts prohibited are without deterrent effect unless they are punishable as 
crimes[,]”103 holding those creating the elaborate scheme has significant 
deterrent effect. 
“We refuse to accept the notion that lawyers may do anything, 
including violating the law, to zealously advocate their clients’ interests 
and then avoid criminal prosecution by claiming that they were ‘just 
doing their job.’”104  In many states in the United States, a legal advisor is 
                                                 
99 Draft Code of P&SM, supra note 3, at art. 6. 
100 HARRIS, supra note 15, at 503. 
101 High Command Case, supra note 2, at 490. 
102 Id. at 486. 
103 Hostage Case, supra note 18, at 1240. 
104 In the United States, a lawyer is responsible for his advice to his client and may be 
sued in civil court under professional malpractice.  See, e.g., Doe v. Hughes, 838 P.2d 804 
(Alaska 1992) (rendering a law firm guilty of professional malpractice because it breached 
the duty of care owed to the client).  Generally, a lawyer may also be disciplined by a 
state’s highest court for professional misconduct.  The Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
state that: 
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domestically responsible for his work product.  His responsibility flows 
to his client and to the licensing authority that permits him to practice 
law.  In addition, when the legal advisor is counseling the government 
on issues involving international law, the legal advisor has an obligation 
not only to the general welfare of the citizenry105 and the specific 
government agency requesting counsel,106 but also to the international 
community.  
Especially in this age of globalism, a legal advisor’s responsibility 
necessarily extends to the international community.107  Because 
“international law is not the product of an international legislature,”108 
the legal advisor’s role is especially important.  Therefore, when a legal 
advisor takes a direct role in an international crime, he must be held 
responsible for it.  In addition, where the legal advisor takes a direct role 
in a policy that, while technically legal, creates a permissive atmosphere 
for illegal conduct, the legal advisor must be responsible for creating 
safeguards to prevent the possibility of illegal conduct. 
                                                                                                             
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts 
of another; 
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation; 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice; 
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government 
agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules 
of Professional Conduct or other law; or 
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a 
violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (2004); see, e.g., In re Carnesi, 784 N.Y.S.2d 892 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (accepting attorney’s resignation and ordering that the attorney be 
disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys). 
105 See, e.g., United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming defendant 
lawyer’s conviction for conspiracy to defraud the United States and obstruction of justice). 
106 Bilder & Vagts, supra note 11, at 693. 
107 See generally Winston P. Nagan, Lawyers Roles, Identity, and Professional Responsibility in 
an Age of Globalism, 13 FLA. J. INT’L L. 131 (2001) (explaining the various roles of a legal 
advisor). 
108 MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 5, at 221. 
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